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Information technology investments and the management consulting industry witnessed 
unprecedented growth in the last decade. This led to regulators’ (SEC and Congress) 
allegations that consulting services that are provided by incumbent auditors may be 
disguised extra payments to auditors for favorable financial reporting. However, there 
may be alternative valid reasons for procurement of consulting. Under new legislation 
(proclaimed in the aftermath of spectacular failures like Enron and Worldcom), publicly 
traded corporations that engage professional services firms to provide both audit 
services and consulting services must now disclose the extent and nature of these 
services. Using the data made available by these new mandated disclosures and using 
                                            
1 Robert Kauffman was the accepting senior editor. Fu-Ren Lin, Ryan Sougstad, Shu-Chun Ho, 
and Ram Subramanyam were the reviewers. This paper was submitted on March 11, 2004, and 
went through four revisions.  
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the theoretical backdrop of the resource-based view (RBV), this paper examines 
whether investments by firms in consulting services follow predictable patterns driven by 
economic factors. Thus, rather than examine whether IT consulting has any ex-post 
value or whether procurement of consulting impairs auditor independence, this study 
focuses on whether investments, ex-ante, follow logical patterns consistent with 
microeconomic principles. Our analysis shows that procurement of IT and management 
consulting is consistent with the resource-based view –companies seek to develop 
organizational capabilities they lack as dictated by their strategic business need. In 
contrast to the narrow “IT Doesn’t Matter” view, it can be argued that even in the current 
environment of IT outsourcing, firms must carefully match their IT capability (in-house or 
outsourced) with organizational strategy and capability to develop unique and inimitable 
resources as put forth by RBV. We find that companies are indeed investing consistent 
with fundamental tenets of financial value analysis and based on market expectations of 
performance. More specifically, after controlling for pressure to perform and cash 
availability, low margin and low turnover companies spend more on consulting services. 
Low-margin strategy companies expend more on consulting when their asset turnover is 
also low, while low-turnover strategy companies expend more on consulting when their 
earnings margin is also low. 
 
Keywords: Resource-based view, Sustainable competitive advantage, Sustainable 




The last decade ushered in an era of rapid growth in the global consulting services 
industry. Some estimates show that the worldwide market for management consulting is 
worth $100 billion, having grown from less than $10 billion only a decade ago 
(Management Consultancies Association website, www.mca.org.uk). Other reports 
suggest management consulting is expected to top $125 billion by the end of 2005 
(BusinessWeek, 2004). In addition, worldwide information technology (IT) spending (not 
just consulting) reached $965 billion in 2004 and is expected to increase at a compound 
annual growth rate of 6% from 2004 through 2008 to $1.2 trillion. In the U.S. alone, IT 
spending was expected to reach $416 billion by 2005 year-end (IDC Analysts, 2005). As 
investments in management consulting and IT have increased, so also have the number 
of research studies examining if and under what conditions these IT and consulting 
investments yield positive returns. IT and management consulting expenditures are 
different from IT investments in building hardware and software infrastructure. 
Consulting is meant to identify and build unique and non-imitable resources that enable 
firms to become competitive and sustain this edge, consistent with Barney (1991) and 
the resource-based view (RBV) discussed in the following paragraphs. While investment 
phenomena of such sustained magnitude (over a decade) invite inquiry, research to date 
has been held back by a lack of data sources containing all the desired (relevant) 
variables. As a result, the research that has been done has often arrived at inconsistent 
results (see Anderson et al., 2005 for an excellent review of this stream of research).  
 
Such mixed and non-definitive findings should not be surprising for at least two reasons. 
First, whether investments in management consulting services yield substantial positive 
returns is conditioned on many environmental factors. Given that it has been difficult to 
establish a direct link between productivity and IT, a link between productivity and 
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consulting is even more tenuous, because such consulting is meant to build a set of IT-
related capabilities that can deliver superior performance thus making it a multi-step 
linkage. Exacerbating the challenge, there is widespread disagreement regarding what 
are appropriate proxies for measuring productivity or other relevant economic factors. 
Second, there is a dearth of publicly available information that allows measurement of 
many of the factors that are believed to be potentially relevant. This is because 
companies were heretofore not required to disclose payments made to management 
consultants separately in their public documents (such as SEC 10K filings and annual 
reports). In the face of limited information, researchers have resorted to other methods 
such as surveys of organizations, their employees, and other observable proxies (Wright 
and Kittay, 2002; Wooldridge, 1997; Redman and Allen, 1993). These are precisely the 
ingredients for diverse research findings that do not easily articulate. Thus, while a 
rational market hypothesis would posit positive returns for these huge and sustained 
investments, empirical research has failed to definitively document this, in spite of which 
we have seen continuing procurement of such services by firms. 
  
Carr (2003) contributes significantly to the discussion of IT, its performance impacts, and 
its non-relevance in creating competitive advantage. His article “IT Doesn’t Matter,” 
asserts that IT is a commodity that does not offer a competitive distinction; therefore it 
does not provide a competitive advantage and has lost its strategic value (Strassman, 
2003). In making such statements, he concludes: (1) IT is ubiquitous and not scarce; 
and (2) it is easily replicable (often at lower prices due to rapid price deflation). In fact, 
Carr (2003) states: 
 
“What makes a resource truly strategic – what gives it the capacity to be 
the basis for a sustained competitive advantage – is not ubiquity but 
scarcity. You can gain an edge over rivals by having or doing something 
they can’t have or do.” 
 
In our study, we show empirically that procurement of IT and management consulting is 
need-based, dictated by economic imperatives and consistent with extant theory in 
management of information systems, namely, the resource-based view of the firm 
(Barney, 1991). Ironically, RBV is the same theory Carr uses to argue that IT 
investments lack the characteristics of a “unique” resource and thus lack strategic value.  
 
Carr’s argument bears a striking similarity to RBV, which states that above-normal 
returns accrue to firms that have valuable, rare, inimitable, non-substitutable resources 
and capabilities (Barney, 1991). Naturally, this viewpoint has come under fierce criticism 
by many scholars in the information technology and information systems fields. The 
strategic and competitive advantage embedded in IT is realized only if it is deployed 
intelligently and innovatively to solve business problems and “create customer value at 
high speed, low cost and the right scale” (Broadbent, McDonald and Hunter, 2003). 
Skaistis (2003) echoes the same view and states that to make IT matter, firms must use 
IT to optimize and streamline critical business processes. Lewis (2003) states that 
“strategic advantage comes from how we apply IT – that is how well IT fits with our 
corporate strategy and business models.” Obviously, their conclusions regarding the 
strategic relevance of IT are at odds with Carr. The difference between Carr and the 
others mentioned above is that Carr regards IT as mere “capital investment” in hardware 
and software (a narrow and restrictive definition), while the others view IT as a “capital 
plus business process” investment that encompasses how IT is deployed in the 
organization. 
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Whether or not IT and consulting services lead to superior performance, the fact is that 
procurement of IT and consulting services has increased dramatically in recent years. 
Why have firms increasingly invested in IT and consulting services especially in light of 
Carr’s assertions and the contradictory findings of prior research? Specifically, is this 
increase in the procurement of IT consulting consistent with extant management 
theories? While prior research has primarily focused on whether investment in IT and/or 
consulting results in performance improvement, we provide evidence that consulting 
expenditures may be a consequence of firm performance.  While we derive our 
hypotheses based on RBV, we will discuss how the procurement of such services is 
consistent with sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) (Porter, 1985; Coyne, 1986). 
 
In this paper, we argue that the sustainable growth rate model (SGR) embodies the 
essence of RBV. Consequently the elements of SGR can be used to ascertain whether a 
company possesses the necessary organizational capabilities that align with its strategy. 
Given the existence or lack of valuable organizational capabilities, we are then able to 
make predictions derived from RBV, and we show that companies’ investments in 
auditor-consultants are consistent with fundamental tenets of financial value analysis 
(using the sustainable growth model) and based on market expectations of performance. 
With regard to what factors lead some firms to buy more (or less) consulting services, 
we find that companies that under-perform in selected strategic areas spend more on 
consulting services. 2 This serves as an alternative explanation to regulators’ (SEC and 
Congress) allegations that consulting services that are provided by incumbent auditors 
may be disguised extra payments to auditors for favorable financial reporting. 
 
The contribution of this paper to the IS/IT literature is two-fold. First, we show that by 
moving away from a narrow view of IT to a broader definition that includes how IT is 
deployed in an organization (which requires the support of IT/management consultants), 
procurement of such consulting is consistent with the expectation that IT has strategic 
value. This finding is important to counter the increasingly popular belief set forth by Carr 
(2003) that IT lacks strategic value. Second, from a theoretical perspective, we 
contribute to RBV by testing its empirical content. This is particularly important in light of 
ongoing discussion of whether RBV can rise to the level of a theory (Priem and Butler, 
2001a, 2001b; Barney, 2001). In their criticism of RBV, Priem and Butler (2001a), note 
that for RBV to be accepted as a theory, it needs to have empirical content. Barney 
(2001) welcomes the suggestion and notes that one way of providing empirical content 
to RBV is to derive empirically testable results from the theory. We have done precisely 
that in this paper, albeit differently from RBV-based empirical studies that link IT 
capability to firm performance (Santhanam and Hartono, 2003; Bharadwaj, 2000). 
 
Our paper is also consistent with observed patterns in IT spending. As companies 
increasingly outsource IT functions such as network infrastructure, data center activities, 
and even software development (Feld and Stoddard, 2004, Gartner Research, 2006), 3 
                                            
2 Note that this study does not examine whether performance and consulting are simultaneously 
determined or whether performance improvements lag implementation of consultants’ 
recommendations. Instead we focus on determining whether procurement of consulting services 
is need-based and consistent with fundamental tenets of financial value analysis.  
3 The characteristics of such outsourced applications are: (1) they are web browser enabled, (2) 
the user organization does not own the application but pays a per user subscription fee, (3) the 
hardware infrastructure is also not owned by user organization, (4) the application is installed at a 
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the organizational leadership (i.e., CEO, CIO, CFO etc.) must ensure that different 
services and components being outsourced are well articulated and correctly integrated 
under an overarching common framework so as to deliver productivity and value, and 
hence the required competitive advantage to their firms. As this paper shows, 
procurement of consulting services to enable such coordination, is consistent with RBV 
. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief 
discussion of prior research in the areas of RBV, and sustainable growth rate and show 
how RBV can be employed in the context of procurement of consulting services. We 
thereby motivate our current study and state what research questions are addressed by 
our study. Section 3 deals with hypotheses development. Section 4 discusses the data, 
its collection, and our research method. Section 5 provides the analysis of our data and 
a discussion of the results. We conclude in Section 6.   
 




Management Consulting and Information Technology 
 
Over the years, management consulting has had an increasing impact on the modern 
business organization. While there is no precise definition of what constitutes 
management consulting, there is a growing consensus that it involves some strategy 
formulation and implementation, and more recently, information technology management 
(Wooldridge, 1997). Some of the reasons for the growth of the management consulting 
industry are (1) increasing uncertainty and complexity in the business environment 
caused by globalization and deregulation; (2) increasing demand for reengineering 
business processes; (3) emergence of the credo of focusing on core competency; and 
most importantly (4) the competition for talent and ideas. The increasing importance of 
information technology and the hope and frustration of implementing IT has further 
fueled the growth in the management consulting industry. In recent times, consultants 
have moved away from the traditional role of just giving advice to actively participating in 
implementation of ideas and technology.  
 
Indeed, the growth in the provision of consulting services by auditors is striking. In 1990, 
accounting and audit services accounted for 71% of the revenue from SEC audit clients, 
consulting services accounted for 12%, and tax services accounted for 17%. In 1999, 
only 48% of their revenues were from audit services, while consulting services 
accounted for 52% (Public Oversight Board, 2000). Precise estimates of the IT portion of 
consulting expenditures are not available; however, there are some estimates that 
indicate the IT related portion is non-trivial. For instance, based on a sample of 1,200 
large, mid-cap, and small-cap companies, the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(2002) estimates that financial information systems design and implementation (not 
including other IT-related consulting) alone accounted for 20% of consulting revenue. 
The Wall Street Journal (2001a, 2001b) reviewed disclosures of 307 (of S&P 500) proxy 
statements and estimated that in 2000, these companies paid about $900 million in audit 
                                                                                                                                  
secure data center or at the vendor’s premises, (5) the service provider protects the 
data/databases, and (6) there are no additional service fees for upgrades. 
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fees and $2.5 billion in consulting fees, out which about $500 million was financial 
information systems design and implementation (about 25%). Also note that sharp 
increases in the consulting revenue of audit firms coincided with increased IT spending 
by companies (in the 1990s), indicating that much of consulting revenue was derived 
either through information system design, strategy for IT, implementation, or training. 
 
Obviously, as the IT and management consulting industry has dramatically expanded in 
recent years, the question that yet remains unanswered is whether the spending is 
simply the result of a fad, or a “mistaken assumption of IT’s potency” as Carr (2003) 
states; 4 or is the spending consistent with the economic imperatives of creating a 
competitive advantage – something that can be explained using extant theories in 
management, specifically RBV? With their intimate knowledge of client operations and 
industry expertise, audit firms are ideally placed to provide consulting services and help 
with implementation of IT projects designed to provide the required competitive edge.  In 
the ensuing sections, we view the procurement of IT and management consulting 
through the RBV lens. 
 
Resource-Based View of the Firm 
 
According to traditional economic theory of the firm, in the normal course of business 
absent any market imperfections, above average returns will not accrue to any firm in 
any industry since such returns will be competed away by rivals or by new entrants to 
the industry. In the normal course of business, no single firm has any competitive 
advantage. However, empirically one can see that in every industry some firms enjoy 
above average returns while others suffer below average returns. The RBV offers an 
explanation for this phenomenon. Heterogeneity among firms (firm-level differences) 
allows some of them to enjoy above average returns (Barney, 1991, Wernerfelt, 1984, 
Miller, 2003). In terms of implementing a strategy to achieve above normal returns (i.e., 
sustained competitive advantage), Barney (1991) offers the following: “A firm is said to 
have a sustained competitive advantage when it is implementing a value creating 
strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors 
and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy.” Coyne 
(1986) expressed a similar view, stating that there must be some difference in the 
product/delivery attribute of the firm relative to its competitors and its competitors cannot 
or will not take any action to close the gap. Clearly, RBV theory suggests building 
“unique”5 resources for achieving sustainable competitive advantage. 6  
                                            
4 Because of speculation in some quarters that audit firms’ consulting services fees may be a 
“reward” for favorable audit reports and not genuinely need based (Solomon 2002, National 
Economic Research Associates 1992), it is interesting to examine whether this speculation is 
accurate, just as studies of executive compensation were fueled by reports in the business press 
that stock options were a means of “rewarding” CEOs and others with tax deferred income which 
was not really performance based (e.g., Anderson et al., 2000). Whether auditors indeed 
provided favorable audit reports to companies that purchased large amounts of consulting is an 
issue beset with disagreements. Frankel et al. (2002) find a positive relation between the extent 
of nonaudit service fees and earnings management, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) dispute their findings. 
We show that procurement of consulting services is consistent with theory and economic 
imperatives and do not claim to resolve whether audit quality is compromised as a consequence. 
5 In this case, “unique” is meant to convey the dimensions that Barney (1991) mentions in his 
article, namely, valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable. 
6 Note that, in terms of achieving sustained competitive advantage, Coyne (1986) and Barney 
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But what are these unique, valuable resources? By definition, valuable resources are 
hard to find. Solutions that lead to “economizing” such as enterprise systems, 
technology, downsizing, etc. are not considered to have any competitive value because 
they are available to everyone in the industry (Porter, 1996). In fact, Carr (2003), by 
defining “information technology” as hardware and software, effectively argued that IT 
cannot create competitive advantage because hardware and software are ubiquitous 
and easily replicable. However, proprietary processes, subtle skills, and specific 
organizational competencies aligned with product market strategies may be considered 
to be valuable resources (Barney, 1991, Collis, 1991, Miller and Shamsie, 1996). 
Indeed, most research that followed the initial RBV article emphasized the importance of 
building organizational capabilities (Barney, 1992, Teece et al., 1997, Lado and Wilson, 
1994). Barney (1992) defined organizational capabilities as organizational characteristics 
that “enable an organization to conceive, choose, and implement strategies.” A firm 
makes a choice of a product market and/or financial market strategy and ensures that its 
resources are cleverly deployed to support its chosen strategy. 7 
 
Motivation for Current Study 
 
Resource-Based View and Information Technology 
 
According to Barney “RBV emphasizes strategic choice, charging the firm’s 
management with the important task of identifying, developing and deploying key 
resources to maximize returns.” In the RBV world, firms can create sustainable 
competitive advantage through (1) tangible resources, (2) intangible resources, and (3) 
organizational capabilities (Grant, 1991; Mata et al., 1995). Organizational capabilities 
are described as complex combinations of assets, people, and processes that 
organizations use to transform inputs to outputs. In an IT context, these include 
deployment of information technology solutions that are aligned with corporate and 
organization structure and strategy so as to create unique, non-imitable intangible assets 
that provide sustainable competitive advantage. Thus, firms often employ the services of 
an expert IT consultant to help exploit IT capabilities to the fullest extent and to create 
capabilities that they are lacking. So firms’ procurement of IT consulting is in line with 
imperatives of shareholder value creation, and creation of competitive advantage under 
RBV, a view that is entirely consistent with Carr’s arguments.  
 
Shareholder Value Creation and Sustainable Growth Rate 
 
The market value of a firm’s stock is determined by its profitability and growth potential 
(Myers, 1977).  The primary measure of profitability is earnings per share (EPS). The 
fundamental consensus market estimate of a firm’s growth potential is the price-to-
earnings multiple or simply the price multiple. The product of EPS and price multiple is 
the market price per share of a firm’s stock. Corporate management creates shareholder 
value (and is rewarded for doing so) through strategic initiatives that increase one or 
                                                                                                                                  
(1991) emphasize the implementation of a value creating strategy that cannot be imitated by 
rivals.  
7 Other definitions of organizational capabilities support this notion. For example, organization 
routines can be considered to be a source of sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1992, 
Peteraf 1993, Teece et al. 1997, Lado and Wilson 1994). 
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both of these items (EPS and/or price multiple). The drivers of increased profitability 
(EPS) and future growth potential (price multiple)8 are successful implementations of 
product market and financial market strategies (Palepu et al., 1997). For a definition of 
terms used in the study, please see Exhibit 1. A firm that demonstrates superior product 
market and/or financial market performance attracts more resources from the investment 
community. In a free market system, this is the mechanism that allocates scarce national 
resources. The drivers of (1) successful product market strategy are superior operations 
management and superior asset management, and (2) successful financial market 
strategy are superior debt management and superior equity management. 
  
In a free market economy, firms that have sustained competitive advantage (i.e., 
companies that deliver sustained above average returns) garner scarce resources from 
investors. How do financial analysts and investment advisors identify companies that 
have sustained competitive advantage? They typically focus on the drivers of growth to 
direct investments. A common measure used by the analysts is the sustainable growth 
rate (SGR). 9 The SGR is the rate at which a firm can grow given its product market and 
financial market strategies. SGR depends upon the management of four key aspects of 
the organization, (1) management of operations (measured by earnings margin), (2) 
management of assets (measured by asset turnover), (3) management of debt 
(measured by leverage), and (4) management of equity (measured by reinvestment 
ratio). Much of financial accounting research is based upon the value relevance of 
accounting and financial statement measures such as the ones described above, 10 
using the theoretical backdrop of SGR. Companies can improve the sustainable growth 
rate only if they improve its underlying components, i.e., net margin, asset turnover, 
leverage, and earnings retention. A conceptual figure of the sustainable growth rate is 
provided in Figure 1. 
 
Sustainable Growth Rate and Resource Based View 
 
Recall that the sustainable growth rate (as defined above) is a measure of how well a 
company has implemented its product market and financial market strategies. 
Companies that have a high sustainable growth rate are those that have been able to 
conceive, choose and implement strategies. This is precisely what Barney (1992) states 
as an example of building unique resources (i.e., organizational capabilities) for 
                                            
8 Price multiple is also known as the price-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) and is defined as the price per 
share divided by the earnings per share (Penman 2001). 
9 Dolan Capital Management (2000) notes that “… SGR and the base of earnings from which it is 
measured are very important concepts” and “… use the components of return on equity (ROE) 
that are current such as profit margins, sales/capital spending, and interest coverage ratios to 
approximate true ROE. These margin and asset turnover ratios are the key components of 
classical ROE”. Morningstar observes that “What the sustainable-growth rate shows, then, is a 
company's potential to deliver the kind of growth that will eventually increase the value of its 
stock” (Morningstar Course 308, 2000). Thus, it is in a firm’s best interest to improve (or maintain) 
SGR to attract more resources from the investment community. 
10 Nissim and Penman (2001) state that “capital markets research” deals with the “information 
content” of financial statements for determining stock prices. The “time series-of-earnings” 
literature (Brown et al. 1995) covers earnings forecasts, often with valuation in mind. Lipe (1986), 
Ou (1990), Ou and Penman (1989), Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Fairfield et al. (1996), have 
examined the role of financial ratios in forecasting. Booth (1998) states that shareholder value 
depends upon increasing the productive use of assets by increasing turnover ratios, thereby 
increasing profit margins and profitability.” 
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achieving sustained competitive advantage under RBV. Indeed, the organizational 
factors that create unique advantages for a firm—such as operational excellence, 
customer intimacy, or product leadership (Treacy and Wiersema ,1993) —are the same 
factors that lead to a superior sustainable growth rate. Therefore, it follows that 
companies that perform poorly in terms of the underlying components of the sustainable 
growth rate are lacking in the organizational factors that create a sustainable competitive 
advantage. According to RBV, in order to succeed, these companies will seek to build 
such organizational capabilities. One precursor to building unique organizational 
capabilities is a firm’s investment in consulting services procured from auditor-




Sustainable Growth Rate = Earnings Margin X Asset Turnover X Dividend Payout 




The purpose of this research is to determine if there is a pattern of investment in 
consulting services that is consistent with the resource-based view of the firm. We do 
this by examining the drivers of sustained competitive advantage (i.e., increased 
profitability in terms of EPS and growth potential in terms of market-to-book value of 
equity) to determine whether investments follow poor performance in multiple strategic 
areas.  The notion here is that companies that lack certain organizational capabilities will 
seek to build these capabilities by procuring greater amounts of consulting services. 
Therefore, the question we ask, as suggested by RBV is: Do firms that under-perform in 
their strategic areas seek significantly greater levels of consulting services than firms 
that enjoy above average returns? We develop testable hypotheses in the next section. 
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Hypotheses Development 
 
Only a few firms excel in all areas (e.g., Wal-mart). For most firms, a successful 
corporate strategy may tradeoff excellence in one area for another.  Discount stores 
(e.g., Office Depot)11 may follow a strategy of low price (net) margins to gain high 
inventory and asset turnover. Purveyors of luxury goods, on the other hand (e.g., 
Tiffany’s)12 emphasize high price (net) margins at the cost of reduced inventory and 
asset turnover. However, the stock market does not reward firms that have both inferior 
margins and poor asset turnover. Where this occurs, senior management is under 
intense pressure to take corrective action. This most likely involves the building of 
organization capabilities that will enable the organization to “conceive, choose and 
implement strategies” (Barney 1992) that will result in a high sustainable growth rate. 
Indeed the pressure on corporate management to report enhanced performance figures 
has been amplified by the myriad instances of global mergers (to acquire “unique 
assets” such as proprietary technology, access to markets and customers, etc.) and 
intensified competition over the last decade. One response to the increased competition 
has been to invest in IT and other high-tech assets and consulting to be better prepared 
to compete in the global marketplace. Consistent with RBV, we argue that investment in 
IT and consulting services signals a commitment to building unique valuable assets that 
would allow firms to enjoy above average returns. The increased complexity and global 
nature of many corporate operations have resulted in greater demands being placed on 
managers to improve the public perceptions of their growth potential, as reflected in their 
firm’s market value.  
 
Consultants are often hired to improve the components of sustainable growth rate 
(product market strategies, financial market strategies, or both). Firms engage financial 
consultants and investment bankers, such as Morgan Stanley to implement financial 
market strategies, while they retain operational and IT consultants (the big 
audit/consulting firms) to improve operations management practices (product market 
strategies). Engagement of outside consultants to aid operations management impacts a 
firm’s sustainable growth rate by (1) affecting analysts’ perceptions of growth rate, (2) 
implementation of new technologies that results in improvement of asset turnover, and 
(3) implementing product development and customer management strategies that result 
in better earnings margins. Many of these areas of potential improvement relate to the 
roll-out of new IS such as enterprise resource planning, supply chain management, and 
customer relationship management applications implemented on networked computing 
platforms. Note that, for the most part, implementation of product market strategies by 
external consultants involves creation or matching of these with unique organizational 
capabilities that are aligned with a chosen strategy.  
 
Since the bulk of consulting fees and IT fees paid to auditors relates to product market 
strategy implementations primarily involving improvements and advice on operational 
activities, we focus on the components of SGR comprising this strategy, namely 
earnings margin and asset turnover. A high margin (for a firm that differentiates its 
products from the competition) indicates successful implementation, while a low 
                                            
11 Office Depot provides an everyday low price guarantee as stated on their Web site at 
www.officedepot.com/renderStaticPage.do?file=/misc/satisfaction.jsp 
12 Tiffany’s focuses on superior customer service, selective growth and protection of its brand 
image. For details see www.shareholder.com/tiffany/ 
Iyer, Ravindran, & Reckers/Procurement of IT Consulting  
 
  Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 207-240/ April 2006 217 
earnings margin is indicative of shortcomings. Likewise, a high asset turnover for a low-
cost producer indicates success, while a low asset turnover for the same needs to be 
addressed. The main issue addressed in this paper is whether firms acquire consulting 
services in a fashion consistent with strategic initiatives that increase shareholder value 
by improving the components of SGR. We posit that, ceteris paribus, companies that 
find themselves deficient in one (or more) of the underlying components of the 
sustainable growth rate will acquire greater levels of consulting services subject to 




Companies can follow different product market strategies: for example, within the 
department store industry, companies may choose to follow either a low margin/high 
turnover strategy (such as J.C. Penney) or a high margin/low turnover strategy (such as 
Nordstrom or Neiman Marcus). Some firms, particularly Wal-mart, excel in all areas 
(high margin and high turnover) because of their innovative use of IT-based solutions to 
reduce costs and drive up margins (Kalakota and Whinston, 1996). A few companies, 
such as Federated Department Stores, perform poorly on both dimensions and may 
have to choose to improve on at least one dimension. Consultants often provide IT-
based solutions that may be targeted toward either margin enhancement or turnover 
improvement. Therefore, it becomes necessary to discuss strategically relevant groups 
based on corporate strategy and industry in order to categorize the firms and make fair 
comparisons. 
 
We envisage four types of companies that represent the 2X2 combination of margin 
management and asset management. These are high margin/high asset turnover 
companies (HH type), high margin/low asset turnover (HL type), low margin/high asset 
turnover (LH type), and low margin/low asset turnover (LL type). Figure 2 depicts these 
subgroups. We develop hypotheses for these strategically relevant subgroups in addition 
to the overall hypotheses. 
 
                         Asset Management 





































Federated Dept Stores 
 
 
Figure 2: Strategically relevant subsamples 
 
Obviously, companies in the HH cell (e.g., Wal-mart) experience the best of times; while 
companies in the LL cell experience the worst of times.  Companies in the HH cell may 
not feel the same intense need to change current operations or to seek outside help that 
is felt by firms in the LL cell. Companies in the LL cell are at risk of buyout or bankruptcy. 
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They are often desperate to obtain outside expertise and help in the form of consulting 
services, if they have the cash wherewithal. Companies in the HL and LH cells often will 
be following a tradeoff strategy: for example, trading off net margin for asset turnover 
and vice-versa. Some firms (e.g., Office Depot or Southwest Airlines) will establish price 
leadership as their comparative advantage. They accept low net margins as part of their 
corporate strategy. These firms, therefore, must produce (maintain) high asset turnover 
figures if they are to be successful (i.e., achieve superior sustainable growth rates).  
These firms will go to some length to ensure that turnover figures remain strong, 
including engagement of non-trivial consulting services. 
 
Other firms stress leadership in service or sell only high-priced (or luxury) merchandise 
(e.g., Tiffany’s). They accept low asset turnover as integral to their corporate strategy.  
These firms, therefore, must produce (maintain) high net margins to drive sustainable 
growth. These firms will go to some length to ensure that their net margin remains high, 
including actions to engage in non-trivial consulting services. 
 
Thus, the extent of consulting expenditure depends upon a firm’s earnings margin, 
turnover, ability to pay, and pressure to perform. We show the empirical model and 
variable definitions in Figure 3 and discuss the theoretical rationale for the hypotheses in 
the following paragraphs. 
 
Operational Management Hypotheses 
 
Earlier we established that the SGR and its underlying ratios indicate the degree to 
which a company possesses needed capabilities to compete. A company that enjoys a 
high earnings margin possesses the capabilities to create and preserve it, compared to a 
company that does not. Similarly, a company that enjoys a high turnover ratio possesses 
a strength that is apparently lacking in companies that do not. Clearly, firms that are 
deficient in either (or both) of these underlying ratios will seek to build capabilities that 
enable them to compete better with their rivals. Thus, based on the RBV and SGR, 
companies that have relatively lower earnings margins and lower asset turnover ratios 
will turn to IT and consulting services to build such capabilities to compete effectively. By 
doing so, they also seek to boost their operating margin and asset turnover ratios as a 
precursor to improving market value. By improving operations and asset management, a 
firm competes more effectively for capital resources in the stock and bond markets. 
Thus, our first two hypotheses relevant to all companies are: 
 
Hypothesis 1a (Earnings Margin Hypothesis): Fees paid for consulting 
services will be negatively related to earnings margin.  
 
Hypothesis 1b (Turnover Hypothesis): Fees paid for consulting services 
will be negatively related to asset turnover.  
 
Strategically Relevant Subgroups 
 
We established that companies in strategically relevant subgroups may be meaningfully 
compared; also that most companies face the necessity of adopting a tradeoff strategy: 
trading off low performance on one factor for high performance on the other factor. Now 
we develop hypotheses for strategically relevant subgroups. The motivation for all 
strategically relevant subgroup hypotheses stems from our belief that RBV manifests 
Iyer, Ravindran, & Reckers/Procurement of IT Consulting  
 
  Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 207-240/ April 2006 219 
 
 
CONSULTING FEES = α + β1*MEDIAN FEES +  β2*EARNINGS MARGIN + β3*ASSET       
                                      TURNOVER + β4*MARKET TO BOOK + β5*CASH POSITION + ε   
 
CONSULTING FEES = α + β1*MEDIAN FEES +  β2*EARNINGS MARGIN + β3*FIXED  
                                      ASSETS + β4*RECEIVABLES + β5*INVENTORIES + β6*MARKET TO 
                                      BOOK + β7*CASH POSITION + ε  (Drill down regression specification) 
 
Pressure To Perform                                                                         Cash Reserve 












                                           H1a                                         H1b 
 
                                           H3                                            H2 
                                                                                          
 
Earnings Margin                                                                          Turnover 
     Hypothesis                                                                            Hypothesis 
 
Firm size (proxied by Sales Revenue) is also controlled for. We do this by scaling 
Cash Reserves, Earnings and Consulting Expenditure by Sales; the other variables in 
the model are ratios. 
 
Variable  Definition 
Dependent Variable 
CONSULTING FEES the ratio of non-audit service expenditure to sales for 2001 
Independent Variables 
MEDIAN FEES the median of CONSULTING FEES (by industry category) 
EARNINGS MARGIN the ratio of earnings to sales for 2001 
ASSETS TURNOVER the ratio of sales to average total assets for 2001 
MARKET-TO-BOOK the market to book value of equity ratio at the end of 2000 
CASH RESERVE the ratio of cash at the beginning of 2001 to sales for 2001 
RECEIVABLES the ratio of sales to average receivables for the year 2001 
INVENTORIES the ratio of cost of goods sold to average inventory for the year 2001 
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itself clearly when capabilities are compared across strategically similar companies, (i.e., 
when we compare a low margin company to other low margin companies or a low 
turnover company to other low turnover companies). 
 
Not all companies may be interested in building similar capabilities. While, in general, 
low turnover is indicative of a lack of expertise in turning over assets quickly, if it is a 
result of a chosen strategy (high margin – low turnover strategy), it may not be 
problematic. On the other hand, low turnover is extremely problematic for companies 
that have a low margin too. These companies need help to identify the causes of low 
turnover and to build superior and unique organizational/IT capabilities to rectify the 
situation (consistent with RBV and SGR). Thus, the strategically relevant subgroup 
hypotheses are: 
 
Low Margin Group (LH (low margin, high turnover) and LL (low margin, low turnover) 
Combinations) 
Companies in this group have low margins – either as a chosen strategy or due to 
underperformance – while asset turnover can be high or low (hence LH and LL). In order 
to be successful, these companies must excel in the other operational performance 
factor, asset turnover. The RBV suggests that companies in this group will procure 
consulting services to build or improve their asset turnover capability. Therefore, for this 
group we posit that investment in consulting services will be negatively associated with 
asset turnover. The following hypothesis is tested for low margin companies (companies 
in the LH and LL cells) 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Turnover hypothesis on subsample): For low earnings 
margin companies, fees paid for consulting services will be negatively 
related to asset turnover. 
 
Aggregate asset turnover can be decomposed into accounts receivable turnover, 
inventory turnover, and fixed asset (bricks and mortar) turnover. It may be of interest to 
conduct a drilldown analysis into these components of asset turnover.  While consultants 
in the short run may not necessarily be able to address and provide remedies to low 
fixed asset turnover, low receivables turnover and low inventory turnover solutions are 
frequently sought and provided (e.g., just-in-time inventory and supply chain 
management technology solutions).  Thus the following sub-hypotheses are offered to 
extend Hypothesis 2. 
 
H2a (Receivables turnover hypothesis): For low earnings margin 
companies, fees paid for consulting services will be negatively related to 
accounts receivable turnover. 
 
H2b (Inventory turnover hypothesis): For low earnings margin companies, 
fees paid for consulting services will be negatively related to inventory 
turnover. 
 
H2c (Fixed assets turnover hypothesis): For low earnings margin 
companies, fees paid for consulting services will be unrelated to fixed 
asset turnover. 
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Low Turnover Group (HL (high margin, low turnover) and LL (low margin, low 
turnover) Combinations) 
Companies in this group have low turnover as either a chosen strategy or due to 
underperformance while margin can be high or low. In either case, to be successful, 
these companies must excel in the other operational management performance factor 
(i.e., must have superior margins). RBV suggests that companies in this subgroup will 
procure consulting services to build or improve existing capabilities that relate to net 
margin. Thus, in this group, companies that have below average margins will tend to 
procure greater levels of consulting services than their counterparts that have healthy 
margins. The third operational strategy hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Earnings hypothesis on subsample): For low asset turnover 
companies, fees paid for consulting services will be negatively related to 
net margin. 
 
Control Hypotheses - Pressure to Perform and Cash Reserve Hypotheses 
 
In addition to the three main hypotheses, we have two hypotheses that control for growth 
prospects and the cash position of the company. Growth and cash position are important 
controls necessary to distill the relationship between consulting fees and operational 
management factors. These controls are described in the ensuing paragraphs. 
 
Pressure to Perform Hypothesis 
Pressure to perform can be inferred from the excess of firm value over the value of 
assets in place. In a seminal paper, Myers (1977) suggested that firm value is comprised 
of value of equity/assets in-place and value of growth opportunities. The market assigns 
a multiple to the book value (value of equity/assets in-place) of the firm based on the 
expectation that the firm will take advantage of opportunities to grow, expand, or develop 
competitive advantage. Higher multiples are indicative of greater market expectations of 
the firm, and in such companies a significant portion of firm value is based on market 
expectation. Indeed, the sustainable growth rate attempts to measure the ability of a 
company to meet its growth potential. Such companies must, to retain the confidence of 
the investors, demonstrate their ability to exploit growth opportunities. Indeed, not 
meeting earnings expectations leads to an immediate and significant loss of firm value. 
According to the New York Times (June 29, 2002), firms that missed analyst estimates 
often lost 10% of their market value. When Cisco missed an earnings consensus 
estimate (declared after close of trading) by one penny on February 6, 2001, it lost about 
6% of its value even before the market opened the next day. Thus, companies that have 
high multiples have greater pressure to perform well. Furthermore, management 
compensation research has shown that companies that have high market expectation for 
growth place more weight on stock-based compensation plans and less weight on salary 
and bonus adjustments (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Gaver and Gaver, 1995) to 
encourage managers to identify and exploit business opportunities. These managers are 
under intense pressure to perform (i.e., meet or exceed market expectations) in order to 
maintain firm value. Indeed, in an RBV world, these firms are expected to possess 
unique capabilities that will propel them to succeed. Consequently, the managers of 
these firms are compelled to invest in the building of valuable RBV assets and perhaps 
also signal the same to investors. Therefore we posit that managers of companies that 
are under greater pressure to perform are more likely to seek outside consulting help to 
complement internal expertise. Thus, we state our first control hypothesis (controlling for 
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the growth rate) as: 
 
Hypotheses 4 (Pressure to perform Hypothesis): Fees paid for consulting 
services will be positively related to the market-to-book ratio. 
Cash Reserve Hypothesis 
Requisite cash reserves are necessary not only to finance payment to consultants but 
also to implement improvements suggested by the consultants (such as IT 
infrastructure). Thus, controlling for cash availability is important to distill the relationship 
between consulting fees and operational management factors. For example, distressed 
companies often do not engage the services of a consultant, not because of a lack of 
need, but because they do not have requisite cash. While it is true that some companies 
can and do finance IT and IS services through borrowing, the lack of requisite cash 
illustrates that these companies must carefully assess the tradeoffs of raising the 
required amount through different means (long-term debt, short-term debt, equity 
financing, etc.). All of these issues relate to their financing strategy and impact the 
company’s cost of capital. However, in general, the greater the cash balance, the easier 
it is to engage consultants and implement their suggested solutions. Therefore, our 
second control hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 5 (Cash reserve hypothesis): Fees paid for consulting 
services will be positively related to the cash reserves position of the firm. 
In the following section we discuss the data, sample, and research method.  
 
Thereafter, we present the results and our analysis. 
 




We obtained expenditure data on consulting fees (including IS and other consulting 
services) paid to incumbent auditors (for the year 2001) from the SEC for a total of 564 
firms. This type of data has only recently become available through newly mandated 
disclosures by the SEC. Note that the data used in this study pertains to the year 2001, 
which is the pre-Sarbanes Oxley period. President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 into law in April 2002, and the SEC wrote the related rules in 2003. Interestingly, 
many types of consulting services were proscribed by this act, including financial 
information system design and implementation. We obtained firm-specific data from 
income statements and balance sheets for these companies from COMPUSTAT. We 
used firm CUSIP (company identifier) in order to match SEC data with archival data from 
COMPUSTAT (for the year 2001). Seventeen companies were dropped from the SEC 
sample of 564 companies because their CUSIPs were unavailable. Of the remaining 547 
firms, we eliminated 158 firms comprising Utilities (since their earnings margin is 
controlled by regulation), and Insurance, Banks, and Financial Services (because their 
asset bases and asset management policies are very different from manufacturing and 
other service industry companies). We grouped the remaining firms into four industry 
categories based on their primary activity. The industry categories were (1) 
Transportation and Healthcare (26 firms), (2) Chemicals and Allied Products (74 firms), 
(3) Electrical, Electronics, Engineering, and Building & Construction Materials (96 firms), 
and (4) Wholesale, Retail, Media, Entertainment, and Miscellaneous Services (88 firms). 
After accounting for missing values for the variables of interest, the final sample 
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consisted of 284 companies (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Sample 
 Number of Companies 
Initial Sample on Consulting Fees from SEC  564     
Less: Companies with no CUSIP (17) 
Less: Utilities, Banks, Insurance and Financial Companies (158) 
Less: Missing data on any one of the variables (105) 
FINAL SAMPLE 284 
 
After eliminating the middle 20% for the subsamples (partitioned into high and low 




As mentioned earlier, we obtained the expenditure data (for the year 2001) on non-audit 
services from the SEC. Other variables obtained from COMPUSTAT were 
 
Sales - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #12 
Cash - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #1 
Earnings - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #18 
Total Assets - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #6 
Fixed Assets - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #8 
Receivables - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #2 
Inventories - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #3 
Common Shares Outstanding - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #25 
Share Price Fiscal Year End - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #199 
Book Value - COMPUSTAT Annual Data Item #60 
 
We listed the dependent and independent variables in our model in Figure 3, which also 
specified the two regression models actually estimated. We explain all the regression 
variables here; noting that all variables are scaled by a measure of firm size (sales) or 
calculated as a ratio to eliminate potential heteroscedasticity issues. The relative 
expenditures for consulting services (CONSULTING FEES) served as the dependent 
measure in all of our analyses.  The other variables served as surrogates for our 
hypothesized independent variables.  Each is discussed in turn.  
 
For operational management factors, we used the following variables: net operating 
profit margin and operating asset turnover are measured by EARNINGS MARGIN = 
earnings / sales and  ASSET TURNOVER = sales / total assets, respectively. Drill down 
metrics for components of asset turnover are measured by receivables turnover 
(RECEIVABLES) = sales / average accounts receivable, inventory turnover 
(INVENTORIES) = cost of goods sold / average inventory, and  fixed asset turnover 
(FIXED ASSETS TURNOVER) = sales / average fixed assets. The first control variable, 
representing pressure to perform, is measured by the market-to-book value of equity 
ratio (MARKET-TO-BOOK) at the end of the fiscal year 2000. Given that market 
expectation of growth represents the excess of market value over value of assets in 
place (Myers, 1977), the most frequently used measure of this expectation in previous 
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studies has been market-to-book ratios such as the market value of the firm to the book 
value (Smith and Watts, 1992, Gaver and Gaver, 1995). The second control variable, 
cash reserves, is measured by cash on hand (CASH RESERVE) at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. In addition to the above variables, the median level of spending on non-audit 
services computed based on the industry categories was also used as a control variable 
(MEDIAN FEES) to control for industry level spending. This variable is computed as 




To enable analyses related to strategically relevant subgroups, the data was partitioned 
into subsamples based on net margin and asset turnover resulting in “high” and “low” 
sub samples. For example, the high margin (high turnover) subsample consisted of 
companies having net margin (turnover) above the 60th percentile (computed based on 
industry category), and the low margin (low turnover) subsample consisted of companies 
having net margin below the 40th percentile (based on industry category). We dropped 




The regression model we used to test Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 is as follows: 
 
CONSULTING FEES = α + β1*MEDIAN FEES + β2*EARNINGS MARGIN +  
                                      β3*ASSET TURNOVER + β4*MARKET TO BOOK + β5*CASH  
                                      POSITION + ε  
 
The regression model we used to test the drill-down Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c is as 
follows: 
 
CONSULTING FEES = α + β1*MEDIAN FEES + β2*EARNINGS MARGIN + 
                                      β3*FIXED ASSETS + β4*RECEIVABLES + β5*INVENTORIES +  
                                      β6*MARKET TO BOOK + β7*CASH POSITION + ε  
 
This model is similar to models used in prior accounting studies, namely Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003), Frankel et al. (2002), Whisenant et al. (2003), Antle et al. (2002), Abdel-Khalik 
(1990), Palmrose (1986), and Simunic (1984). Most accounting studies focus on the 
relationship between consulting fee and audit fee or focus on whether engaging auditors 
as consultants compromises auditor independence. We use a similar model to ascertain 
whether consulting fees are systematically related to client characteristics. 
 




We present descriptive statistics for the full sample in Table 2. The means and standard 
deviations indicate that there is sufficient variation in the sample to perform regression 
analysis. Variances in the four industry groups are similar to that in the full sample. 
 
 
Iyer, Ravindran, & Reckers/Procurement of IT Consulting  
 
  Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 207-240/ April 2006 225 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (N=284) 
Variable Mean Median Std dev 
CONSULTING FEES 0.0008 0.0005 0.0010 
MARKET TO BOOK 4.1446 2.2145 8.8207 
CASH RESERVE 0.0763 0.0284 0.1320 
ASSET TURNOVER 1.5048 1.1933 1.3151 
EARNINGS MARGIN 0.0537 0.0422 0.0667 
TURNOVER DRILLDOWN    
RECEIVABLES 14.2299 7.6270 22.7545 
INVENTORIES 17.6934 5.7230 69.9656 




To ensure the reliance of results obtained from the various regressions on the sub-
samples, we tested for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test. Results 
indicated that while the full sample was marginally heteroscedastic, there was 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in the partitions. 
Results of the test appear in Table 3.  The above result also provides support to our 
theory-driven partition of the full sample into strategically relevant subsamples. 
 
Table 3: Breusch-Pagan Test For Heteroscedasticity 
Group chi-square p-value 
Full Sample 12.54 0.08 
Sample Split by Margin   
Low Margin Group 2.90 0.72 
High Margin Group 9.71 0.10 
Sample Split by Turnover   
Low Turnover Group 9.23 0.12 
High Turnover Group 8.75 0.13 
 
Correlations, Collinearity And Normality 
 
Table 4 presents pairwise correlations of independent variables from the regression 
model. We note that the correlations are below the threshold of 0.80 (Kennedy, 1992). 
The only exception was the correlation between fixed assets and total assets (ρ > 0.80). 
However, since fixed assets and total assets are not used in the same regression 
equation, this high correlation is not a relevant issue. In addition, we conducted a 
diagnostics test for multi-collinearity among the regressors (Belsley et al., 1980). 
Condition numbers were well below the cut-off level of 20 (the maximum condition 
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The primary reason for scaling consulting expenditures by sales was for normalization. 
As a preliminary step, we checked the histogram of regression residuals to see if the 
assumption of normality was met and satisfied ourselves that this was true. As an 
additional check, we plotted histograms for the dependent and each of the independent 
variables in the regression model. For the dependent variable, the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 
test indicated insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of normality. Histograms 
of the independent variables in each half-sample (overall and by industry) and a 
histogram of the regression residuals (overall sample as well as the half-samples) 
visually confirmed that assumptions of normality were satisfied. 
 
Hypotheses on the Full Sample 
 
We present findings related to the first hypotheses in Table 5.  Note that p-values are 
one-tailed values for MARKET-TO-BOOK, EARNINGS MARGIN, CASH RESERVE, and 
ASSET TURNOVER since we have prior expectations for these variables (Horwitz and 
Ferleger, 1980). In contrast, the reported p-values for the intercept and industry median 
consulting fees are two-tailed p-values.  
 
The significant negative relationship of consulting fees to net margin and asset turnover 
support our earnings hypothesis and turnover hypothesis. Fees paid for consulting 
services are negatively related to current performance in the areas of operations 
management (net margin) and asset management (turnover). Therefore, operational 
activity measures of the sustainable growth model are negatively related to spending on 
consulting services.  In addition, the control variables are also significant in the predicted 
direction. The positive relation of consulting fees to MARKET-TO-BOOK supports the 
pressure-to-perform hypothesis that firms that have greater pressure to perform spend 
relatively more on consulting services. These firms have the most to lose (in terms of 
investor confidence and firm value) if they fail to meet market expectation of 
performance. The significant positive relationship of consulting fees to cash on hand 
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Table 5: Relationship of Consulting Fees to Turnover and Margin 
Dependent Variable = CONSULTING FEES 
Independent Variable Coefficient (Std. Error) t-statistic(p-value) 
Intercept 0.0007 (0002) 3.29*** (0.0011) 
MEDIAN FEES 0.3002 (0.3406) 0.88 (0.3788) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.0001 (0.00002) 4.25*** (<0.0001)a 
EARNINGS MARGIN -0.0015 (0.0009) -1.65** (0.0499) a 
TURNOVER -0.0001 (0.00004) -3.12*** (0.0010) a 
CASH 0.0017 (0.0004) 3.83*** (0.0001) a 
Model F Statistic (p-value) 10.27 (< 0.0001)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.1407 
Number of Observations 284 
a one-tailed p-value  *** Significant at 1% level  ** Significant at 5% level 
 
supports the cash reserve hypothesis that firms that have the wherewithal to pay procure 
more consulting services. The fit may be on the low side, but we are interested in 
splitting up the full sample into subsamples based on high or low earnings margin and 
high or low asset turnover and looking at the model fit in each subsample where we 
expect the R-squared values to be higher. 
 
Hypotheses On The Subsamples 
 
Table 6: Relationship of Consulting Fees to Turnover and Margin  
Low Margin Subsample - Dependent Variable = CONSULTING FEES 
Independent Variable Coefficient (Std. Error) t-Statistic(p-value) 
Intercept 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.80 (0.4259) 
MEDIAN FEES 0.6029 (0.3994) 1.51 (0.1341) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.0001 (00002) 6.66*** (<0.0001) a 
EARNINGS MARGIN -0.0024 (0.0020) -1.24 (0.1097) a 
ASSET TURNOVER -0.0001 (0.00004) -2.17** (0.0163) a 
CASH RESERVE 0.0018 (0.0007 2.65*** (0.0047) a 
Model F (p-value) 15.68 (<0.0001)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.3897 
Number of observations 115 
a one-tailed p-value  *** Significant at 1% level  ** Significant at 5% level 
 
Table 6 provides data germane to the tests on the strategically relevant subgroups (i.e., 
Hypothesis 2 and 3). Consistent with the predictions in Hypothesis 2 (Turnover on 
Subsample Hypothesis), among low margin firms, asset turnover is negatively related to 
consulting fees. These firms are either in the distressed LL group (which indicates they 
are desperate for help) or at best have potentially adopted a low margin strategy (LH 
group) where underperformance in terms of asset turnover is not acceptable. Therefore, 
firms that have relatively low asset turnover will seek a relatively higher level of 
consulting services. Table 6 also indicates support for our control variables (pressure to 
perform and cash reserves). 
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We present results for the low turnover subsample in Table 7. As hypothesized in 
Hypothesis 3 (Earnings on Subsample Hypothesis), among low asset turnover 
companies, profit margin significantly (albeit marginally) and negatively associates with 
consulting fees. Low turnover companies comprise firms in the LL cell or the HL cell. 
Companies that are in the LL cell are distressed and therefore, are likely to seek 
consulting help. Companies in the HL cell have either accepted or find themselves in a 
low turnover strategy, and thus depend upon high margins to propel sustainable growth. 
For such firms, low margins are unacceptable. Therefore, low asset turnover companies, 
whether they are in the LL cell or the HL cell, cannot afford to have low margins too. 
Similar to the other regressions, the control variables are also significant and in the 
predicted direction in this regression. 
 
Table 7: Relationship of Consulting Fees to Turnover and Margin  
Low Turnover Subsamples - Dependent Variable = CONSULTING FEES 
Independent Variable Coefficient (Std. Error) t-Statistic(p-value) 
Intercept 0.0006 (0.0005) 1.20 (0.2322) 
MEDIAN FEES 0.7141 (0.5694) 1.25 (0.2125) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.0001 (0.00003) 4.41*** (<0.0001) a 
EARNINGS MARGIN -0.0020 (0013) -1.47* (0.0727) a 
ASSET TURNOVER -0.0006 (0.0004) -1.64* (0.0520) a 
CASH RESERVE 0.0024 (0.0007) 3.59*** (0.0003) a 
Model F (p-value) 8.39 (<0.0001)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.2432 
Number of observations 115 
a one-tailed p-value  *** Significant at 1% level  ** Significant at 5% level  *Significant at 
10% level 
 
Table 8 presents the results for Hypotheses 2a (Receivables Turnover on Subsample 
Hypothesis), 2b (Inventory Turnover on Subsample Hypothesis) and 2c (Fixed Assets 
Turnover on Subsample Hypothesis). Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis 2b, 
among low profit margin firms, inventory turnover significantly and negatively associates 
with consulting fees. As predicted in hypothesis 2a, receivables turnover significantly 
(albeit marginally so), and negatively associates with consulting fees. Regarding 
hypothesis 2c, fixed asset turnover does not significantly associate with consulting fees. 
These findings broadly support our hypotheses. 
 
These findings are what would be expected of firms emphasizing low cost leadership as 
a corporate strategy. Having accepted low profit margins as a part of corporate strategy, 
these firms must make up for low margins with high sales volumes and rapid inventory 
turnover (e.g., Wal-Mart) and faster collection of receivables.  Conversely, among firms 
following a high margin strategy, concessions are typically made to inventory turnover. 
Indeed, among high margin firms, analysis (not presented in tabular form here) reveals 
that inventory turnover is not significant (t=0.41; p=0.34).   The results also show, as 
predicted, that long-term fixed asset turnover solutions are not often sought from 
auditor/consultants to offset low margins. Again, the control variables, pressure to 
perform and cash on hand, are significantly and positively related to consulting fees, as 
predicted.  
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Table 8: Relationship of Consulting Fees to Turnover and Margin Drill-down to 
Receivables Turnover, Inventory Turnover and Fixed Asset Turnover 
Low Margin Subsample - Dependent Variable = CONSULTING FEES 
Independent Variable Coefficient (Std. Error) t-Statistic (p-value) 
Intercept 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.35 (0.7303) 
MEDIAN FEES 0.7548 (0.4066) 1.86* (0.0661) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.0001 (0.00002) 6.85*** (<0.0001) a 
EARNINGS MARGIN -0.0030 (0.0020) -1.55* (0.0623) a 
RECEIVABLES -0.00005 (0.00004) -1.43* (0.0775) a 
INVENTORIES -0.000002 (low) -2.12** (0.0180) a 
FIXED ASSETS -0.000001 (0.00002) -0.52 (0.3004) a 
CASH RESERVE 0.0018 (0.0007) 2.64*** (0.0048) a 
Model F (p-value) 12.24 (<0.0001)*** 
Adj R2 0.4062 
Number of observations. 115 
a one-tailed p-value  *** Significant at 1% level  ** Significant at 5% level  * Significant at 
10% level 
 
Finally, a note on the explanatory power of the regression models: In Tables 5-8, which 
report the regression results, two have an adjusted R2 of about 40%. Table 5 has the 
lowest adjusted R2 of about 15%. This is expected because this regression is based on 
the full sample. As we explained earlier in the paper, companies are better compared if 
they belong to the same strategic subsample. Consequently, the R2 improves when we 
split the sample into high/low margin and high/low turnover. The low margin grouping 
has the highest adjusted R2 of about 40% (Tables 6 and 8). Table 7, which is the 
regression on the low turnover subsample, has an adjusted R2 of about 25%. These are 
in line with prior accounting studies on nonaudit fees (0.330 in Antle et al., 2002; 0.280 in 




Prior research has focused on whether investment in IT and consulting results in 
performance improvement. We provide evidence that consulting expenditures may well 
be a consequence of firm performance. There are other actions that a firm can 
potentially take in order to improve performance, including firing senior management and 
creating a new management team, or looking for technological innovations through 
collaboration, etc. However, RBV suggests that underperforming firms will want to build 
unique organizational capabilities (which can be addressed by engaging the services of 
auditor-consultants), and our empirical analysis provides confirmatory evidence of this 
phenomenon. Specifically, we show that firm expenditure on management consulting 
services provided by public accounting firms can be explained by firm specific factors. 
These factors are (1) pressure to perform, (2) performance in the areas of operations 
management and asset management, and (3) availability of cash. Pressure to perform 
and availability of cash are significant in all subsamples. Performance measures in the 
areas of operations management and asset management reflect the strategies of the 
companies. By linking procurement of consulting services to RBV, this study tests the 
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theoretical underpinnings of RBV. This is especially important in the light of ongoing 
discussion of whether RBV can rise to the level of a theory (Priem and Butler, 2001a, 
2001b; Barney, 2001). In their criticism of RBV, Priem and Butler (2001a) note that for 
RBV to be accepted as a theory, it needs to have empirical content. Barney (2001) 
welcomes the suggestion and notes that one way of providing empirical content to RBV 
is to derive empirically testable results from the theory. We have done precisely that in 
this paper. Further, as noted in the Introduction section, the “IT Doesn’t Matter” view of 
Carr is not inconsistent with RBV; the idea is for firms to innovatively use possibly 
ubiquitous IT hardware and software in synchronization with existing or newly created 
organizational capabilities so as to create a “scarce” organizational resource that 
provides long term advantages.  
 
The results of this study are important not only to managers of underperforming firms but 
also to firms that offer consulting services, especially IT-related management consulting. 
First, by showing that there is a valid explanation for seeking these types of services 
(using the available disclosure data), we partially alleviate the concerns arising from the 
alternative explanation that auditor-consultants are merely being rewarded for favorable 
reports (again, we point out that we do not explicitly test for this effect). The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act has subsequently proscribed certain types of consulting services from being 
offered by auditor-consultants. The question now may arise as to how firms that feel the 
need to improve their performance will react. Where will they be able to procure these 
services? The current trend of outsourcing IT and information-related services may offer 
an explanation. Spin-off organizations such as Accenture (the old Andersen Consulting) 
or BearingPoint (formerly KPMG Consulting) or firms like Gartner Inc. that are in the 
business of working with client organizations to identify IT needs and help them leverage 
the technology to achieve business success will step into the void. Web service and 
application service providers will act as partners by taking up the outsourced 
requirements that will result from client organizations seeking to achieve even more 
economies in their IT related costs and operations. Second, the study provides avenues 
for providers of consulting services to identify and seek out potential clients. The 
consulting firms can even add to their portfolio of services to attract precisely these types 
of clients. 
 
An extension to RBV, Dynamic Capabilities Theory (Teece et al., 1997) can help draw 
managerial implications for this study. Teece et al. (1997) complement RBV by 
developing a dynamic capabilities approach to firm wealth creation and assimilation. 
This approach is meant to explain how firms build competitive advantage in times of 
rapid change, similar to the Schumpeterian view of innovation-based competition that is 
achieved by “creative destruction” of existing competencies (Schumpeter, 1934). This 
dynamic capabilities perspective serves the purpose of providing implications for 
managerial practice, which is what we use to justify our model. This further approach 
emphasizes the creation of hard to imitate combinations of organizational, technological, 
and functional capabilities and becomes especially relevant in the turbulent environment 
of rapid IT innovations where the technology is available to all firms in an industry and 
success or failure depends on how well it is deployed. Porter (1996) points out that firms 
sometimes mistakenly allow tools such as total quality management and business 
process reengineering to take the place of strategies. What is required is a strategy that 
emphasizes “…a firm choosing a unique and valuable position rooted in systems of 
activities that are much more difficult to match….” Dynamic capability is created by 
getting a firm to select not just a specific technological capability, but also one that 
leverages this technology in the context of the firm’s organizational capability, thus 
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providing the correct fit. This enables the firm to differentiate its operations from 
competitors and thus deliver a performance boost. 
 
Thus, there is a convergence of viewpoints across these theories. An organization must 
build unique capabilities involving a match between implementation of available IT 
solutions and other organizational competencies. The paper draws upon theoretical 
perspectives that may not be new to the field of IS, but that offer rich opportunities for 
theory testing and empirical research in interdisciplinary research settings. We believe 
that such research will serve the purpose of guiding firms’ investments in consulting 
services that build long-term competitive advantage based on complementary 
combinations of information technologies, organizational capabilities, and product-
market strategy. In our selection of the relevant theories, we believe we identified those 
that are most likely to enhance understanding of such trends. 
 
Like any research study, this one has limitations. Notably, we must point out that the 
data available to us does not bifurcate consulting expenses into IT-related and other 
consulting services. In the absence of this level of detail, we have relied upon sources 
that  inform us that IT-related consulting forms a non-trivial component of total consulting 
services provided by auditor-consultants. In addition, this is a study of a cross-section of 
firms. Therefore any macroeconomic or environmental factors are captured by including 
an industry-level variable in the analysis. Further, it relates to a single year, thus the 
generalizability across years, geographical regions, and regulatory regimes is limited. 
 
Second, our derivation of the empirical regression specification relies upon the premise 
that consulting fees lead to an enhanced sustainable growth rate, which is eventually 
reflected in higher performance. However, we do not test this side of the equation. 
Future research should direct attention on the possible simultaneity between expenditure 
on consulting services and performance. Is there a bi-directional relationship between 
the two, with spending being determined by the firm’s needs and performance 
improvements brought about as a result of the spending on consulting services?  
 
One problem that may face researchers here is the difficulty of assessing the influence 
of such expenditures on current or even future performance. As we stated in the 
introduction, these consulting services include the provision of IT-related investments 
and improvements in IT infrastructure. When the purpose of such expenditures is to 
automate, the observed effects may be on specific business processes and not directly 
relatable to performance improvements. When these consulting services take on an 
informating role, improving the collection and dissemination of information within an 
organization, they work through managers and employees to improve decision making 
and coordination of activities. At the highest level, when such expenditures take a 
transforming role, their impact depends on the firm’s success in making changes to its 
organizational structure and motivating employees to adapt to new ways of doing 
business. In all cases, therefore, the measurement of performance impacts must be very 
carefully carried out so as to bring in intermediate or process level variables that in turn 
may affect bottom line firm performance. Future research may address these issues. 
 
Finally, in the days of the dot com boom up to late 2000, it was possible that firms had 
earmarked budgets for consulting services. It was also possible that these same firms 
did not realize the expected performance improvements when the bubble burst after 
2001. Further, during difficult times and times of recession, the axe usually falls on 
activities such as hiring, training, and consulting services—the ones under discussion in 
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this paper. So it is possible that the level of spending on consulting activity has not been 
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Appendix 1 
 
Mathematical Formulation Of Sustainable Growth Rate & Derivation Of 
Empirical Specification 
 
Sustainable Growth rate (SGR) is defined as follows: 
 
SGR = EarningsMargin x AssetTurnover x DividendPayout  











youtDividendPa =  
 
The first two terms form part of product market strategy and the last term forms part of 
financial market strategy (see Figure 1). Since IT consulting expenses are typically 
incurred to improve and enhance product market strategy, we consider only net margin 
and asset turnover as the relevant elements of the SGR in this paper. 
 
Since SGR is a measure of performance, we can consider the traditional input/output 
model for deriving the appropriate empirical specification. The basic assumption is that 
greater amounts of consulting services procured will lead to better performance in latter 
years. Based on this assumption and using the traditional (Cobb-Douglas) production 
function approach we state that: 
 
SGR = a * (CONSULTING FEES)b where a is a scaling factor and b is the productivity 
impact of CONSULTING FEES. 
 
Employing the logic that lower SGR (observed currently) will impel managers to look to 
consultants to improve future performance, and based on the previous equation, 
CONSULTING FEES can be expressed as  
 
Log(CONSULTING FEES) = c + d * Log(SGR) 
Expanding SGR into the two components of interest namely Earnings Margin and Assets 
Turnover,  
 
Log(CONSULTING FEES) = c + d*Log(Earnings Margin) + d*Log(Assets 
Turnover). 
 
However, because of the difficulty of interpreting a logarithmic specification of Earnings 
Margin and Assets Turnover (both of which are ratios that involve sales as a measure of 
firm size) we convert this into a linear regression specification that uses sales to 





 c + d1*EarningsMargin + d2*AssetsTurnover or  
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FEESCONSULTINGADJUSTED = , 
=MARGIN  EarningsMargin, and  
overAssetsTurnTURNOVER =  
 
The complete specification is derived by adding the appropriate control variables, 
namely CASH and MARKET-TO-BOOK. 
 
Exhibit 1 – Explanations of Terms Used 
 
TERM DEFINITION 
Sustainable Growth Rate 
The rate at which a firm can grow given its product market and 
financial market strategies. Mathematically this is the product of 
the earnings margin, asset turnover and dividend payout. 
Earnings Margin The ratio of net income to net sales 
Total Asset Turnover Ratio of net sales to average total assets. It represents how often the firm is turning over its assets – a measure of efficiency. 
Inventory Turnover Ratio of net sales to average inventory. 
Fixed Assets Turnover Ratio of net sales to average fixed assets. 
Receivables Turnover Ratio of net sales to average receivables. 
Price to Earnings Multiple Ratio of price per share to earnings per share. It represents the consensus market estimate of a firm’s growth potential. 
Market to Book 
Ratio of the market value of a firm to the book value of assets. 
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Exhibit 2 - Linking RBV and SGR 
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    Margin and                                     Business processes,  
Turnover improve                             activities and routines  
                                                                    improve 




      Consultants                                      Right combination 
   participate in IT planning                           of IT, organizational  
    with CIO and functional                         structure, and workflows 
          heads                                          create non-imitable 




























Company attracts very little 
capital resources due to low 
performance indicators 
such as margin and 
turnover ratios 
Low SGR (sustainable 
growth rate) 
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